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Summary  findings
Gray reviews the goals of privatization and evaluates  Formal programs of enterprise privatization are often
various methods used to achieve them in different  only a small part of the picture, although they get the
transition settings. The task is not only to change  most attention. Even where formal privatization has been
ownership but to create good corporate governance and  slow (as in Bulgaria and the Ukraine), a process of asset
to further the development of legal norms and  "recombination"  is occurring, often behind the scenes -
supporting institutions needed in full-fledged market  whether a recombination from state to private firms or
economies. Initial results of privatization programs are  from some private firms to others. In the Czech
only part of the picture. How they foster further  Republic, for example, the ownership of enterprise
evolution of ownership is equally important.  shares by funds and of fund shares by individuals will
Experiments in privatization abound, from extensive  change through formal and informal trading, but the
efforts at sales to strategic owners (as in Estonia and  ownership of enterprise  assets may also shift to some
Hungary), to programs based primarily on insider  extent as owniers  or managers sell or spin-off assets into
buyouts (as in Russia and Slovenia), to innovative mass  new companies. In Russia, this shifting of assets to new,
privatization programs involving the creation of large  more closely held firms may be quite widespread, as
and powerful new financial intermediaries (as in the  managers with small minority  ownership stakes in newly
Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland). Each approach  privatized firms try to gain greater control  over assets. As
has inherent strengths and risks. But if the objectives are  one Hungarian observer noted, this is the period of
to sever the links between the state and the enterprise, to  "primitive capital accumulation" in the post-socialist
school the population in market basics, and to foster  world. Formal programs may lay important ground rules
further ownership change, the initial weight of evidence  but uncertainties of every type overwhelm most formal
seems to favor significant reliance on voucher  efforts at privatization. The final outcome  is far from
privatization, especially given the difficulty most  predictable.
countries have finding willing cash investors.
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Lessons of Experience with Privatization
and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies
Socialism's  primary defining characteristic was the state ownership of virtually all
productive assets.  Moving from state to private ownership, and creating the conditions in
which privately owned entities can thrive and prosper,  are the main tasks of the transition from
socialism.  This paper summarizes the policy lessons of experience to date with privatization
of medium and large enterprises in transforming socialist economies.  It attempts to describe
the complex and intertwined goals of privatization (far more than simply transferring property
rights),  the pros and cons (to the extent we know them') of various methods used to privatize
state enterprises, 2 and progress achieved to date in various countries.
1.  THE  GOALS OF PRIVATIZATION
The privatization task goes beyond changing ownership of assets per se.  Privatization
programs  in transition economies should be evaluated on three broad dimensions:  (1) the
corporate  governance mechanisms they create, (2) the supporting institutions they foster,  and
(3) the extent to which they create a self-sustaining economic and political reform process.
While this paper focuses primarily on the technical effectiveness and economic impacts of
various forms of privatization, their political impacts-including  their perceived fairness, their
political legitimacy, the extent to which they create new decentralized centers of political
power, and their contribution toward creating a class of property owners who favor and
support continued liberalization and reform-are  equally important.  Although some
I Two caveats  are in order.  First, it is still  quite early  to search  for lessons,  as the transition  experiment  is
still  underway  in all formerly  socialist  economies.  Second,  cross-country  comparisons  are dangerous,  given  the
differences  among  countries  in initial  conditions.  However,  experience  to date may  provide  some  benefits  of
hindsight  to relative  latecomers  in the transition  process.
2  This paper focuses  on privatization  of potentially  competitive  enterprises  in industry,  trade, and services. It
does  not discuss  privatization  of utilities,  farms,  or  state-owned  real estate  outside  of the enterprise  sector (whether
commercial,  agricultural,  or residential).governments judge revenues to be an important goal of privatization, it is at best secondary to
the three key objectives noted above.
The patterns of ownership immediately resulting from any program of privatization are
unlikely to be optimal.  Initial ownership may be too dispersed, or it may be concentrated in
the hands of entities that are unable or unwilling to use it efficiently.  A critical determinant of
the longer-run success of any privatization program is therefore the extent to which ownership
rights can change and evolve to more efficient forms.  Programs that spur institutional
development, in particular the growth of capital and asset markets, will have a distinct
advantage in this regard.
A.  Creating  "Real" Owners
The primary economic goal behind privatization is to create true representatives for
capital, and thereby to change the fundamental objectives of enterprise owners toward greater
efficiency. Although the state was the dominant owner of productive assets during socialism,
the state itself was, always and everywhere, an amorphous collection of disparate interests.
No one individual or group of individuals clearly reaped the gains from more efficient use of
scarce capital, as private owners do in capitalist economies.  Given that the interests of capital
were weakly represented if at all, other interests-whether  those of the Communist party, the
state security apparatus, branch ministries, workers, managers, or local government officials-
controlled decisionmaking.  The result was extensive, ad hoc, ex post redistribution between
firms and/or individuals, often from winners to losers to keep the latter afloat, that undermined
incentives for efficiency.
Creating  "real" owners is not sufficient to ensure changes in the behavior of managers,
however.  These owners must also have the power, incentives, and capability to practice
effective corporate governance,  i.e. to monitor managers and assure that they act in the best
interests of the owners.  For small firms this is straightforward,  and indeed in most small
firms the owners and managers are one and the same.  For large firms, however,  the likely
separation of ownership and management creates the need for monitoring.  Although
shareholder monitoring  is only one of numerous constraints on managerial behavior in
2advanced market economies,  it is likely to be more important in the early stages of reform in
CEE economies to the extent that markets for products, capital, and/or managerial labor are
still underdeveloped and thus may not yet exert strong competitive pressures on managers.
Shareholder monitoring can be passive or active.  Passive shareholders rely on "exit" as
their main discipline on managers, while active shareholders rely more heavily on "voice".
The U.S.  model is heavily weighted towards "exit," while the German and Japanese models rely
more on "voice" (Roe, 1993).  In Central and Eastern Europe, where stock markets are still in
their infancy, exit is unlikely to be an efficient and widespread option for most owners for
some time to come, and thus active shareholder monitoring is likely to be a critical mode of
corporate governance in the near term.  Furthermore,  markets are not in equilibrium,  and
major improvements in efficiency are likely to depend not so much on marginal changes in
managerial behavior as on successful large-scale restructuring at the firm level.  Alternative
patterns of corporate governance should therefore be judged not only on how they affect day-
to-day decisionmaking but also on how they affect a firm's  capacity for radical change and
restructuring.
Changes in objective functions are not the only potential benefits that come with real
owners.  Privatization can also create opportunities to bring fresh capital, technology, ideas,
and management styles to firms, thereby complementing the incentive changes brought about
by reform to boost the productivity of enterprises.  Such injections of new skills are especially
important for firms set up to produce in a central planning regime rather than to function in a
competitive market system.  Whether these other benefits arise, and indeed the nature of the
underlying change in the objective function arising from privatization, depends to large extent
on the technique used to privatize and the distribution of ownership that results.  Different
types of private owners-whether  "insiders" or "outsiders",  individuals or institutions,  locals
or foreigners-all  bring different mixtures of both goals and capabilities to the firms they own.
Creating the optimal mix is the corporate governance challenge.  Furthermore,  the move from
public to private may involve intermediate forms of property-neither  wholly public nor
wholly private-with  their own rationality in the particular setting and their own distinct
3incentive characteristics (Stark,  1996).  Changing formal  ownership is necessary but not
sufficient; creating effective corporate governance is the more complex task.
B.  Establishing Supporting Institutions
Although privatization has been pursued by many market economies since the early
1980s, the task of privatization in formerly socialist economies is so much larger that its very
nature changes.  Indeed, the ultimate goal in the transition economies is more than simply
changing ownership or governance per se.  Rather, it is to establish the institutions of a private
market economy.  Definitions of property rights and the rules, professions,  and organizations
that support property ownership must be created, either before or in tandem with the transfer
of property rights to private owners.
The enormous magnitude of this privatization task results from the complex and
multifaceted legacy of socialism.  Private ownership was not the only institution compromised,
if never completely abolished, by socialism.  The institutions that support private ownership
also largely disappeared.  Legal frameworks defining property rights, private contract regimes,
fiduciary liability, dispute resolution mechanisms, and rules of entry and exit for private firms
atrophied.  Courts lost much if not all of their independence as well as their role as
adjudicators of commercial disputes and enforcers of commercial laws.  Banks lost their
independent monitoring role over firms and became instead passive funnels for channeling
state funds.  "Watchdog"  institutions that provide critical information for markets to function,
such as credit-rating and consumer protection services, accounting and legal professions, and
independent journalism,  had no reason and/or permission to exist.  Finally, socialism inhibited
(indeed, often classified as illegal) the development of basic norms and ethics of market
conduct and fiduciary responsibility on which so much behavior in advanced market economies
implicitly rests.  These legal frameworks,  commercial court services, financial institutions,
"watchdog"  services, and norms of behavior need to all be recreated.
4C.  Creating a Sustainable Reform Process
Transforming property rights and building the institutions of a private market economy
necessarily take time.  Therefore it is critical that these reforms be politically and
economically sustainable and mutually reinforcing.  Yet knowing ex ante how to promote
sustainability is not easy, due to the often profound tension between the need to work with
existing stakeholder interests and the desire to ensure positive  economic outcomes that
reinforce the benefits of reform in the public eye.
On the one hand, experience tells us that the design of a privatization program must take
into account the interests of, and distribution of power among, existing stakeholders.
Incentive and efficiency problems were pervasive in all socialist economies, but the
distribution of power among stakeholders varied between countries.  Earlier reforms  toward
"market socialism" in Poland, the former Yugoslavia, and to some extent Hungary, had given
extensive powers to rank-and-file employees to influence decisionmaking in firms.  In contrast,
employees had very little power in CSFR, where controls during socialism remained firmly in
the party bureaucracy and  enterprise management, shifting after the "velvet revolution"  to the
new democratic leadership.  The same is true of east Germany, and this facilitated the
centralized top-down privatization program of the Treuhandanstalt.  The situations in Bulgaria
and the former Soviet Union were somewhere between these two extremes; some influence
had been devolved to workers, but bureaucrats-and  especially managers-retained  strong
powers.  This variation in the distribution of power among stakeholders would profoundly
affect the design and effectiveness of privatization programs in the various countries.  For
example, CSFR and east Germany could design and effectively implement  top-down
privatization programs;  Poland, Russia, and Slovenia had no such option.
On the other hand, it is also clear that accommodation to stakeholder interests has its
risks and is often in profound tension with ultimate economic and political goals of
privatization.  Compromises made to co-opt stakeholders or overcome short-run information or
institutional weaknesses may have negative economic or political repercussions down the road
that diminish the financial and efficiency benefits of divestiture and undermine long-term
economic and political stability.  This may occur, for example, if newly privatized firms fail to
5restructure due to weak corporate governance,  if the results of early privatization are perceived
by the public as corrupt or highly inequitable, or if privatization leads to a concentration of
economic and political power in the hands of a small domestic elite or foreign investors rather
than an expansion of an independent and decentralized local middle class.
Two of many examples of this tension between what is "doable" and what is optimal can
be found in Russia and the Czech Republic.  In Russia, the preferences initially given to
managers to garner political support for the program are proving costly, as discussed later in
the paper.  Not only is there limited evidence to date of any interest in the new owners in real
restructuring  of existing (largely insider-owned) firms, but there is growing resentment over
the power and means being wielded by managers to gain further control over firms'  assets at
the expense of other actual or potential shareholders.3 In the Czech Republic, the designers of
mass privatization gave the large state banks permission and encouragement to set up
investment funds.  This strategy may have arisen from the perceived need to garner public
interest in the program (given that the banks, particularly the savings bank, were arguably
among the more "trusted"  institutions at the time) and thus assure that mass privatization-
then a "radical"  new idea-could  be implemented.  Yet it may prove counterproductive in the
longer run given the high concentration of economic and political power that has resulted in
the hands of a few banks and funds (as discussed in greater detail below), themselves linked to
government through both formal and informal ties.
Despite this inevitable tension between ex ante accommodation and ex post  results,
certain early steps appear to increase the sustainability of reform in any setting. Countries with
legacies of strong bureaucratic control over firms should take early moves to weaken the old
links between firms and line ministries-i.e.  to cut the pervasive subsidies, to weaken the
ministries'  control rights,  and perhaps to abolish branch or sector ministries altogether.4 This
should be accompanied by the quick adoption of a privatization strategy and some means to
3Whereas  only 27 percent of Russians  disagreed  in 1991  with  the statement  that"ordinary  people  will
benefit  from the introduction  of private  property," this percentage  has risen steadily  to 68 percent in 1995  (World
Bank, 1996).
4Old  political  links can be further weakened  by barring  former Communists  from government  service for
a period of time, as was done in CSFR.
6prevent wholesale looting of the newly  "freed" state firms prior to privatization.5 These tasks
may be most easy to accomplished in the period of "extraordinary politics" (Balcerowicz,
1994) immediately following a political break with the past regime.  After these first steps,
each stage of a privatization process should ideally create the momentum and incentives for
further progress.  This occurs, for example, if the new owners arising from the first stage of
privatization lobby politicians to design and implement laws (such as corporate  and securities
laws) that further refine and protect their new rights.
While steady progress is important for momentum, it is still too early to tell if
sustainability is closely correlated with speed.  Very rapid privatization was pushed in the
former CSFR and Russia, in large part on the theory that breaking the links with the state was
the primary hurdle, and that the political window of opportunity had to be seized quickly.
While many aspects of these programs are impressive and they may yet prove to be major
success stories,  the initial design decisions taken to ensure speedy implementation have also
produced serious problems, particularly in Russia.  Their eventual economic and political
impacts are still far from clear.  In contrast,  slower programs of privatization, such as
Poland's  and to a lesser extent Hungary's,  run the risk of barely getting off the ground when
political openness to change is greatest,  and thus of stagnating before major progress can be
achieved.  These slower approaches could, however, still prove sustainable with sufficient
ongoing government commitment to privatization and macroeconomic discipline. The slowest
movers,  such as Bulgaria,  Romania, Belarus and Ukraine, run the greatest risk of stagnation.
The slowness of their official programs does not necessarily mean, however, that no
privatization has occurred.  Given the weakness of transition governments, the absence of
formal privatization programs leaves the door open for massive "spontaneous privatization"
(whether "asset stripping"  or diversion of income flows) by managers.  The economic
injustice of this route may eventually lead to political backlash that undermines the
sustainability of reform
5  This is likely to require a combination of "carrots"  (linking the future well-being of managers to the
quality of the assets they deliver to the eventual private owners) and "sticks" (imposing strong penalties on
managers that divert state assets).
7Finally, it is critical for their success of any privatization program that any reforms in
property rights be complemented with supportive reforms in other areas. On the
macroeconomic side,  fiscal and monetary policies should create a stable price system and hard
budget constraints on firms.  One important  policy lesson of experience to date is that any
privatization strategy-whetherfast  or slow, to insiders or outsiders-is  likely to befairer  and
work better in an environment with tight macroeconomic constraints, where government
subsidies are limited, inflation is controlled, and markets are thus able to exert outside
constraints on managerial behavior.  If governments continue to soften budget constraints
even for private firms,  as they continue to do in many transition economies,  the purported
benefits of privatization (particularly with regard to incentives) may disappear. On the
microeconomic side, reforms in product markets, managerial labor markets, and financial
markets complement and reinforce the constraints emerging from owners of equity through
privatization.  These conclusions do not mean that private ownership and governance are
unimportant,  but rather that they are not by themselves sufficient.
In sum, the task of privatization is not merely one of changing ownership per se.  Rather
it involves changing an entire socioeconomic system; i.e. creating the many institutions needed
in a private market economy to enable owners to exercise full ownership rights and corporate
governance responsibilities.  Because this requires both time and political support, policy
makers need to consider carefully the interests of existing stakeholders and attempt to create a
self-sustaining momentum for change-without  sacrificing the ultimate goal of economic
efficiency and growth.  This is an exceedingly tall challenge.  How have policy makers in
various transition economies tackled it?  The various mechanisms are explored below.
II.  METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION
Privatizing large enterprises in transition economies has proven more difficult than most
observers originally envisioned. Not only are the goals complex and sometimes at odds with
each other, but the firms are often ill-suited to the needs of a market economy.  Having
functioned under socialism's soft budget constraints, many are overstaffed and inefficient.
8Reflecting socialism's efforts to make enterprises the provider of "social assets" as well as
income, many are vast conglomerates with housing, medical services, and child care attached
to industrial facilities.  Having evolved from central planning's need to economize on
transaction costs, many are monopolies.  Table  1 summarizes the various methods used by the
more advanced reformers to privatize medium and large industrial firms and estimates the
extent of privatization in each country under each method. 6 What lessons have emerged from
attempts to privatize this important yet problematic sector?
A.  Sales to Outside Investors
Before the transition process got underway in earnest, most countries of Central and
Eastern Europe wanted to privatize (if at all) through sales of state enterprises as going
concerns.  They were following the only known experience at the time-that  of advanced
market economies (most notably Great Britain) and advanced developing countries (most
notably Chile) where privatization through individual sales had been successful.  Because
capital markets were undeveloped in the transition economies, most hoped to sell the bulk of
state enterprises directly to large outside investors, generally "strategic" investors with
specialized knowledge of the industry in which the firm operates (though Poland hoped in
1990-91 to build a flourishing equity market and divest quickly a significant percentage of its
public enterprises through public offerings-a  hope that did not materialize).  Such "trade
sales" were perceived in the early stages of transition to have at least three advantages: (1)
they would bring in revenue to the state treasury; (2) they would result in "real" owners who
had the knowledge and incentives to govern the company efficiently and the capital to
restructure it; and (3) the sale conditions could theoretically be manipulated to take special
needs into account in each particular sale.
Although these advantages have indeed proven to exist in some cases, sales to outside
investors have proven far more difficult than originally envisioned.  Such sales can work when
6  Table 3 is not intended  to present  exact  numbers  but rather  general  indicators  of privatization  progress.
Exact  numbers  are impossible  to obtain,  in part because  the table  includes  methods  of privatization-such  as debt-
equity  swaps  or asset  sales through  bankruptcy-that  are separate  from commonly-cited  formal  programs  in these
countries.
9Table 1
Privatization  routes  for medium-size  and large enterprises
in advanced  privatizers
(as of end-1995)
Management-
Sales to  employee  Equal-access
outside  buyouts  voucher  Still in state
owners  (MEBOs)  privatization  Restitution  Other'  hands
Country
Czech Republic
Number of firmsb  32  0  22c  9  28  10
Value of firms  5  0  50  2  3  40
Estonia 0
Number of firms  64  30  0  0  2  4
Value of firms  60  12  3  10  0  15
Hungary
Number of firms  38  7  0  0  33  22
Value of firms  40  2  0  4  12  42
Lithuania
Number of firms  < 1  3-5  65-70  0  0  25-30
Value of firms  < 1  3-5  50-60  0  0  35-45
Mongolia
Number of firms  0  0  70  0  0  30
Value of firms  0  0  55  0  0  45
Poland
Number of firms  2  30  6  0  8  54
Value of firms  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
RussiaC
Number of firms  0  55  11  0  0  34
Value of firms  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes:
a.  Includes transfers to municipalities or social insurance organizations, debt-equity swaps, and sales through insolvency
Proceedings.
Includes parts of firms restructured prior to privatization.
c.  Includes assets sold for cash as part of the voucher privatization program.
d.  Does not include some infrastructure firms.  All management buyouts were part of competitive, open tenders.  In some
thirteen cases citizens could exchange vouchers for minority shares in firms sold to a core investor.
Source: Kotrba and Svejnar (1994), Blasi (1994), EBRD (1995); World Bank data.
market institutions  are in place, as in advanced  market economies,  but are problematic  when
such institutions  are in their infancy. East Germany  successfully  privatized  virtually all of its
state enterprises through sales to outside  investors, but only with massive  amounts of political
will and technical  and financial  assistance  from west Germany. Among  the transition
countries, only Hungary  and Estonia have managed  to privatize a major share of their state
enterprises through direct sales.  Poland and Romania  pursued sales vigorously  in their early
10efforts at privatization but with limited success.  All of these experiences provide evidence of
the difficulty of this approach in the transition environment.
What are the disadvantages of the sales approach?  First,  the ability to carry out sales is
hampered by the limited amount of private capital (particularly domestic capital), combined
with the poor quality of information that makes those with capital wary to invest it.  One
option, followed widely in Hungary,  is to sell heavily to foreign investors who have sufficient
capital and are willing to incur risks (or to invest in information-gathering that might decrease
such risks).  This is a somewhat controversial but nonetheless necessary strategy if a program
of trade sales is to succeed (and even then, of course, there will be many state enterprises  that
foreigners have no interest in buying7).  A second option is to require less capital up-front,
giving owners the right to pay in installments out of the future earnings of the firm.  Variants
of this approach have been tried, for example, in Estonia, Hungary 8 and Poland.9
A second disadvantage of sales, following directly from the first,  is the perceived
unfairness of both the process itself and the resulting distribution of ownership rights.  This
perception results not only from the inability of many ordinary citizens to participate,"' but also
from the nontransparency of the process and the resulting potential for arbitrariness  (if not
7  Foreign  interest has tended  to concentrate  in certain  sectors, particularly  those (such  as automobiles,  food
processing,  tobacco, and certain consumer  products)  whose  international  market  structure  tends to be dominated
by large, oligopolistic  firms. Kogut  (1996).
a In late 1993  SPA began  to implement  a program  that  allowed  buyers to pay for firms in installments,  with
15  percent  paid down and  the rest paid over several  years at subsidized  interest  rates.  Even  before 1993  a special
credit  program,  the "existence  loans" (or "E-Loan"),  allowed  buyers  to borrow  at subsidized  rates to purchase  shares
in privatized  firms.
9 One innovative  variation  of that  approach  is the "restructuring  through  privatization"  program  implemented
on a limited  basis in Poland. This unique  program  addressed  the market  imperfections  arising  out of shortages  of
both  capital  and information  by allowing  potential  owners  to bid for an option  to buy  the firm in three years, with  the
requirement  that  they pay only  5 percent of the option  price up-front. The winning  bidder got immediate  control  over
the firm and thus had up to three  years to learn  more about  the firm's potential  and to attempt  to restructure  it and
improve  its profitability. The new owners  reap any upside  gains  by exercising  their option  to buy the remaining  95
percent  of the company  at the initial  bid price. Such  owners  bear only 5 percent  of any downside  losses,  however,
because  they can walk away after  three years if the firm turns out to be worth  less  than the initial  offer. Although
innovative  in design,  however,  the "restructuring  through  privatization"  program  has only  been  implemented  to date
in a handful  of firms.
'° Those  with  significant  amounts  of domestic  capital  at the beginning  of the transition  process  have  tended  to
be the former "nomenklatura",  joined  as the transition  proceeds  by what are often  perceived  as criminal  elements  in
society. Foreign  buyers  are also  generally  viewed  with  suspicion.
11corruption) in individual deals.  This lack of transparency and arbitrariness  has been notable,
for example, in dealings with foreign investors, with whom "enclaves" of incentive packages
and legal rules have often been negotiated case-by-case, and in the 1995 Russian "shares-for-
loans" scheme.
Third, the approach tends to be costly and slow, due to the sheer magnitude of the job of
evaluating and negotiating deals for each company one-by-one and of providing follow-up
monitoring to be sure that contract provisions are fulfilled by the buyers. Sales have also been
slowed by other uncertainties  in the policy environment.  These have included, for example,
questions over responsibility for cleanup of past environmental damage and uncertainties
arising from restitution of real estate to former owners (Rutledge et. al.,  1994).
Fourth,  the process is complicated and often stymied completely by the difficulty of
placing a value on firms to be offered for sale.  Accounting standards and institutions inherited
from socialism were inadequate to determine the historical value of a finn-much  less net
present value  (on which sales price should theoretically be based).  Furthermore,  price and
other reforms  in each firm's  environment quickly lessen if not eliminate the relevance of
previous experience.  There is a profound uncertainty about what firms will look like in the
fiuture, i.e. what products they will produce, in what quantities, at what costs, with what
financing, at what interest rate, and for what markets.  Given this uncertainty it is virtually
impossible in many cases, even with reforms in accounting techniques, to calculate even the
rough value of a firm.
Finally,  like other forms of privatization, sales have been hampered in certain countries
by the explicit or implicit power of insiders to block them.  This has been particularly  true in
countries such as Poland and Russia that had decentralized much decisionmaking power during
socialism.  Furthermore,  the strength of the insiders'  incentives to block a sale is likely to be
correlated with the potential profitability of the firm itself, and thus it may be harder to sell the
better firms-exactly  those for which there is likely to be greater demand from outside
investors.
These many disadvantages have been more debilitating than initially expected.  The
Treuhandanstalt  in east Germany was able to privatize (or liquidate) its 8500 state enterprises
12relatively quickly, but at an enormous cost in terms of both skilled manpower and explicit or
implicit subsidies to buyers (von Thadden, 1994).  The other countries, which lacked a
benefactor of West Germany's  economic strength, could only move slowly-or  adopt radically
different divestiture techniques.  In 6 years (1990 through  1995) Hungary was able to transfer
only about 40 percent of its state-owned assets to private hands through formal sales programs
(Table 1, and Pistor and Turkewitz, 1996).  With extensive assistance from former
Treuhandanstalt officials, Estonia sold most of its enterprises in three years (1992-95).  These
are the "successful"  cases.  None of the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the
former Soviet Union have even come close to these achievements (in large part due to less
interest from foreign investors).  Overall experience  in the region has led most observers to
conclude that sales, while a useful pillar in the privatization process, cannot be the sole or
even primary method relied upon in transition economies.
In addition to direct sales, another form of sale to outsiders involves floating shares of
firms to be privatized on public stock exchanges.  This approach is necessarily limited by the
very small size of the infant stock exchanges in transition economies.  Furthermore,  it tends to
work only for the very best firms with good financial prospects and strong reputations.  It is
not an avenue for restructuring,  not only because poorly performing firms are unlikely to be
listed successfully but also because the dispersed ownership structure that results is unlikely to
create real opportunities for owners to exert pressures for change inside the firm.  Poland has
perhaps had the most success is privatizing "good"  firms with this approach, but still has
privatized only about two dozen firms in this manner.  Initial public offerings (IPOs) are
clearly not the answer to the need for rapid and large-scale privatization, but on the margin
they can help develop capital markets and share trading.
In sum, sales to outside investors may indeed be the best means to create "real" owners
with reasonable incentives for corporate governance and ready access to outside capital,
markets,  technology, and management skills.  However, because of profound problems of
valuation combined with its slowness, complexity, and potential inequity, this approach
appears to be relatively poor in stimulating needed restructuring  in a large number of firms,  in
supporting broader institutional change, or in creating self-sustaining momentum for further
13reforms.  It may be the approach  of choice for certain excellent  firms with willing, capable
buyers, but at best it should  be seen as one of several  pillars in the privatization  strategies  of
transition economies.
B. My  buy"t
A second  mjor  avenue  of privatization  involves  the discount sale or giveaway  of all or
part of the company  to managers or employees  of that company. Most of the transition
economies  have included  rmanagement/employee  buyouts of a majority of enterprise shares
(MEBOs)  in their privatization  programs to some  extent.  The majority  of the privatizations  to
date in Poland, for example, have been MEBOs  in the form of "privatization  through
liquidation"  under the privatization  law.  MEBOs  have also been the primary form of
privatization  to date in Croatia, Georgia, Russia, Slovenia,  and Romania, combined in some
instances  with voucher  privatization  programs that provided the liquidity  for insiders (and in
some cases a few outsiders)  to purchase shares (as described  below). Hungary supplemented
its emphasis  on trade sales with a small but significant  MEBO  program in 1993 in order to
speed  up privatization.  Although  the MEBO  model  was not at the core of the Mongolian
privatization  program, many firms privatized  through Mongolia's voucher privatization
program became  in effect MEJOs (Korsun  and Murrell, 1994).
A major reason for favoring  MEBOs  as a privatization  tool is their political  popularity
and thus their practical feasibility. In countries  where insiders  had strong power over
enterprise decisionmaking  under socialism  (whether  workers as in Croatia, Poland and
Slovenia,  or managers  as in Russia and Hungary), those insiders have generally  been able to
carry over their in.fluence  into the transition period and effectively  maintain  veto power over
privatization  decisions. In some  countries  this veto power is explicit; in Poland, for example,
the approval  of employees  is required for a privatization  plan of an enterprise to go forward.
In most countries, however, such veto power has been implicit;  governments  could gather
sufficient  political  support to adopt  privatization  programs only if those programs gave
generous benefits to insiders.
14What are the advantages  of management-employee  buyouts as a privatization  method?
The first is stated above: MEBOs  are relatively fast and easy to implement,  from both
political  and technical standpoints. The second, at least potential, advantage  is the one
stressed by most proponents  of employee  share-owning  plans ("ESOPs") in advanced  market
economies. Insider ownership  can be both more equitable  and, under certain conditions,  more
efficient than outside ownership  (Hansmann,  1990;  Earle and Estrift, 1996; Shleifer  and
Vasiliev, 1996). It can be more equitable  because  it rewards those who do the work-
ironically, the argument  at the very heart of socialism. It can be mnote  efficient because it has
the potential  to mitigate "principal-agent"  problems  between  owners and workers.  If
information  is costly (which it always is, especially  in transition environments),  the principal,
or owner, will not be able to perfectly monitor the agents (the manager  and workers). Insiders
know more about what is happening  inside the firm and, if given the incentive,  will be able to
shirk, steal, or carry on other practices  that benefit them at the expense  of the owner.  To the
extent the employees  are themselves  owners, the conflict  of interest is reduced. Managers and
non-managerial  employees  may be willing to work harder, mnonitor  each other more carefully,
and encourage  greater productivity  if they reap the residual gains.
These potential  advantages  of MEBOs  are counterbalanced  by several major
disadvantages,  particularly  acute in transition settings. First, giving preferences  to insiders
inhibits if not eliminates  competition  in the privatization  process itself. To the extent that
more qualified  potential  owners are not given the chance  to participate, the resulting  ownership
pattern is likely  to be suboptimal  for the economy  as a whole, at least initially. Second,
insiders  are generally  not able to bring new skills and new capital to the company, and
socialist  managers  may have few of the skills  needed in a market economy. Initial research in
Central Europe appears to confirms that firms, whether small or large, privatized to insiders
carry out less restructuring  and attract less new investmnent  than flims  acquired  by outsiders
(Earle  et al, 1994;  Barberis  et al, 1995). Third, if insiders  own only  part of the company,
conflicts  of interest can arise between  inside and outside ownters  that resemble  the "principal-
agent" problems  described above. If corporate law and disclosure  rules are underdeveloped
and thus provide few protections  for outside  shareholders,  as is true in virtually  all transition
15countries (and also in some advanced market economies), outsiders may be unwilling to invest
at all in firms with significant insider ownership
Given these disadvantages,  MEBOs can lead to serious managerial and worker
entrenchment,  particularly  if other constraints on managers are weak.  Insider ownership is
likely to work differently when it is the main form of ownership in an economy (as in Russia
and Slovenia) than it does when it is in the minority (as in advanced market economies).  It
also works differently in a transition setting, where other constraints on managers are less
developed,  than in a full-fledged market economy, where other constraints can be counted on
to impose discipline within a firm.  If product markets are uncompetitive and securities
markets (and thus markets for corporate control) undeveloped, as is often true in the early
stages of the transition process, managers and workers may act to preserve their jobs or their
control rights rather than improve the functioning of firms.  This is particularly likely if
macroeconomic policies are weak, and thus if incumbent managers can continue to turn to the
state for support (in the form of either direct subsidies or indirect subsidization through the
banking system) even after privatization."  In Russia, for example, some managers of firms
with heavy insider ownership have tried to enforce policies (even though on paper illegal) that
prohibit workers from selling their shares to outsiders, or have used less transparent means to
block either employee or outsider participation or to transfer assets or profits to firms they
control. 12  Given the weakness of laws and institutions, the high cost of information, and in
some cases the laxity of competitive pressures (due in part to the lack of macroeconomic
stabilization), there are so far few if any outside controls on managers to prevent these actions.
If such a pattern is repeated on a wide scale and is allowed to become entrenched, this form
of ownership may inhibit rather than reinforce the development of the macroeconomic
I  Insiders  arguably  have a higher tendency  to place continuing  demands  on the state for support, and
because  of history  and politics, the state arguably  has a higher tendency  to respond  to such demands.
12  For example, managers  may attempt  to change  the form of their company  from joint stock to limited
liability,  because  the latter allows  greater restraints  on sales of shares to outsiders. Alternatively,  they may try to
convince  employees  to put their shares  in a trust with voting  rights assigned  to managers. Even  when there are no
restrictions  on workers' voting  of their shares, managers  may (and  do) convince  workers  that incumbent
management  is on their side  but that outsiders  will fire them if allowed  in.  Finally,  managers  may try to get
around  employee  ownership  altogether  by setting up new firms and using their inside  information  and power to
transfer  valuable  assets to these firms.
16discipline, the competition, and the rules and institutions needed in a private market
economy.  3  It may also backfire politically, as the "fruits"  of privatization become more and
more concentrated in the hands of the few, with growing resentment among those ostensibly
included at the beginning but ultimately cheated of their expected gains.  The recent success of
the Russian communist party reflects in part from disillusion with privatization and the skewed
distribution of its benefits.' 4
How can the advantages of MEBOs-particularly  their political feasibility-be  enhanced
while their disadvantages-particularly  the potential for entrenchment-are  mitigated?  The
approach must be twofold.  First,  it is critical that the government impose tight budget
constraints through macroeconomic discipline to ensure up front that all firms must compete in
the marketplace.  Second, it is important that this one form of insider ownership not
monopolize the entire economy.  The government should encourage the development both of
other forms of ownership that can compete with MEBOs (through product market competition)
and of other owners that can compete with insiders for ownership rights to individual firms
(through markets for corporate control).  With regard to competing forms of ownership,
MEBOs may work well for smaller manufacturing and service firms in sectors open to entry
by new domestic entrepreneurs.  In those sectors product market competition, combined with a
cut-off of subsidies, may keep the insider-owned firms "on their toes".  Foreign competition
could potentially do the same for larger insider-owned firms, but in such cases managers have
greater capability of turning to the state to block such competition or get support of one kind
or another.
With regard to the market for corporate control, there is much evidence from advanced
market economies that insider (particularly worker) ownership has an inherent tendency to
13  C. Freeland  writes in the Financial  Times (4/15/95, p. 2):  "The most damning  criticism  of Russia's
halting  move to a market economy  is that reforms  have failed to put effective  new owners  in charge of the
country's factories, thereby  allowing  old directors  to give full rein to the inefficient  management  practices  of the
Soviet  era and to indulge  in the newer pasttime  of widespread  corruption."
14  One study  calculated  that the 19 percent  of adult Russians  employed  in privatized  firms obtained  56
percent of equity  sold through  June 1994,  while the 81 percent of Russians  who had only vouchers  ended up with
only 15  percent of the equity  (Blasi, 1996). The 'shares-for-loans"  scheme  in late 1995  heightened  public  outrage
as a few banks  controlled  the 'auctions" and got major  companies  for a pittance.
17"degenerate" into investor ownership over time (Earle and Estrin, 1996).  This evidence has
arisen, however,  only in environments with well-developed capital markets.  Whether or not
the same inherent tendency exists in transition environments has yet to be seen.  The biggest
cost of the MEBO approach in transition environments may be that it blocks further  ownership
change. For "degeneration"  to have even a chance in transition environments with large
insider ownership, there must be both a supply of and a demand for shares (i.e. at least a
fledgling capital market).  To create a supply, shares must be immediately tradable to insiders
or outsiders without limitation.  To create a demand, outside investors must have not only
sufficient capital but also basic information and protections against fraud and abuse by
insiders.  Both sides of the equation can be problematic.  In Russia, for example, some
investment funds created out of the mass privatization program, although relatively minor
owners of privatized firms,  are attempting to increase their ownership stakes in more
profitable firms.  They (and to some extent individual domestic entrepreneurs  as well) are
competing with inside managers and banks to buy out employee shares and thereby wrest
control of these firms.'5 Who will ultimately "win" in this competition to acquire enduring
control over valuable enterprise assets depends in part on how rapidly corporate law,
accounting and disclosure rules and practices, and securities markets can develop to encourage
both supply and demand, i.e. to block managerial efforts to thwart outside participation or to
"strip"  assets, and to inform, protect, and thereby encourage outside investors to participate.
"Degeneration"  of insider ownership in Russia has been relatively slow to date.  6
In sum, MEBOs excel in their capacity to adapt to the implicit or explicit demands of
existing stakeholders.  However, their ability to create effective corporate governance
mechanisms, much less to attract new capital for investment and skills for restructuring,
'5  Other types of potential owners, such as foreign investors, are peripheral at this point, although they
may emerge in the second phase of Russia's privatization program.
16  Early surveys indicate that approximately 65-70 percent of the shares of privatized firms ended up initially
in the hands of insiders, with less than one-third of that owned by managers yet far more under the de facto control of
such managers given the passivity of rank and file employees.  Ownership of the remaining one-third of shares was
divided roughly equally between local property funds and outsiders (Blasi, 1994, Earle, Estrin, and Leschenko,
1996).  A recent survey indicates that insider ownership may have fallen by some 10 percent in the past two years
(Blasi, 1996).
18appears relatively weak.  For firms that cannot survive without restructuring,  with or without
new investment, the conflicts of interest that confront insiders when trying to force change
may make MEBOs particularly unwieldy.  In such cases the insiders may look to the state for
help, and, given political pressures,  the state may be more willing to listen to workers.  If
macroeconomic discipline is weak, they may slow the momentum (and even the rationale) for
further privatization,  impede needed fiscal reforms, and stifle the development of private
market mechanisms and norms of behavior.  MEBOs may thus work better for viable firms
that can generate internal funds for investment, and they may be suitable for small firms
without political clout.  Indeed, for the latter employee ownership may have advantages in that
employees may be more willing to take painful wage cuts to preserve the company (Earle and
Estrin,  1996).  However,  for large distressed firms with major capital needs, MEBOs are
unlikely to generate the resources,  incentives, and capabilities to undertake large-scale change.
This pros and cons of MEBOs discussed above relate to majority-insider-owned  firms.
There are, in contrast,  strong advantages and relatively few disadvantages to giving insiders a
minority ownership interest (on the order of 15-20 percent).  One clear advantage is political-
that privatization programs are less likely to be resisted and more likely to be perceived as fair
if workers participate in any upside gains.  Another advantage lies in oversight capacity.
Insiders can play an important monitoring role over managers and/or majority owners,
particularly if the majority interest is in the hands of funds or foreign investors,  who might
otherwise have an incentive to "loot"  the firms or close them down to stifle competition with
other firms under the same owner.  These are clearly important advantages given the political
fragility and the general weakness of outside "watchdog"  institutions in virtually all transition
environments.
C.  Equal-access Voucher Privatization
Apart from sales to strategic investors and transfers to insiders, the other form of
privatization that has been implemented widely across the Central and Eastern European
region is voucher, or  "mass", privatization.  The main similarity among all voucher programs,
and the major difference from the sales approach, is the use of vouchers rather than money as
19the medium to purchase shares in companies.  Vouchers are given or sold at very low prices to
domestic citizens, thereby eliminating the shortage of domestic capital that is the core problem
with the sales approach.  The major difference between "equal-access"  voucher programs and
MEBO's  using vouchers is the absence of legal preferences for insiders in the equal-access
form.  This form of equal-access voucher privatization has been implemented (on varying
scales) or soon will be implemented in Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania. Slovakia, and Ukraine.
If well-designed, voucher privatization can overcome many of the problems with the
various sales approaches noted above, most notably the perceived unfairness, the shortage of
domestic capital, and the difficulty of placing monetary values on state assets.  Because
voucher privatization can proceed rapidly, it can simultaneously stimulate the development of
market institutions and create new stakeholders and/or reorient the interests of existing ones
toward further reform.  Furthermore,  it can speedily cut links between enterprises and the
state that both inhibit restructuring  in firms and put fiscal pressures on the state.  However,  the
road from mass privatization to efficient capitalism is still not an easy one.
The main concern with voucher privatization at its inception, apart from its inability to
raise revenue, was its questionable capacity to develop "real" owners with proper incentives
for effective corporate governance and with access to new capital and skills for restructuring.
The concern over corporate governance arose partly from the very notion of vouchers,  i.e. the
view that one could not value what one did not pay for. 17  More fundamental, however,  was
the fear that the resulting distribution of ownership would be inefficient and would interfere
with the development of strong ownership interests.  Experience has shown, however, that a
wide variety of ownership patterns-whether  dispersed or concentrated, and complemented or
not by the presence of "strategic" investors-can  result from voucher privatization, depending
on specific elements of design.  Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, rather than "lock
in" initial ownership patterns (as programs of sales or MEBOs may do in the absence of
1" Although  in theory individuals  should  be able to perceive of the "opportunity  cost" of even gifts such as
vouchers,  in practice  they seem  to adopt a sort of "easy come, easy go" attitude  to things  not paid for.  In the
Czech  Republic,  for example, it has been noted that people  who invest  vouchers  in voucher funds are much less
likely  to make efforts to oversee  the activities  of those funds than are people  who invest  cash in cash funds.
20developed capital markets),  well-designed voucher privatization can stimulate the development
of capital markets and share trading-whether  shares of companies or shares of funds that own
companies-and  thus foster further ownership change and speed up the development of a
market for corporate  control.  It can, in effect,  "privatize" the privatization process.
1.The Mix of Sales and Voucher Privatization
All transition economies have chosen to follow several privatization routes
simultaneously, but the relative importance of different programs  varies among countries.  The
earliest, biggest, and most successful program to date has been in the Czech Republic.  It has
transferred the majority of state-owned enterprise assets-and  on average the majority of
shares of each privatized firm-through  this route (with the remainder being either sold to
outside investors or maintained in state hands).  The Slovak Republic undertook a large "first
wave"  of voucher privatization in 1992, but has been stalled since the split up of the CSFR at
the beginning of 1993. Mongolia's  program has also been large, privatizing 70 percent of
large enterprises by the end of 1992 and applying to 100 percent of the shares of those firms."
8
Moldova's  recently completed program is of similar magnitude.  Romania's  1991 mass
privatization program was much smaller in terms of proportion of each firm covered; only 30
percent of the shares of eligible firms were transferred to Private Ownership Funds ostensibly
"owned" by the public; the intention (unrealized and replaced in 1995 by a second and larger
mass privatization attempt) was to transfer the remainder to "strategic" owners who could
effectively govern and restructure the company.  Poland's  recently implemented mass
privatization is smaller still, covering only about 500 companies (fewer than one-tenth of state-
owned enterprises),  although for those companies the majority interest is privatized via this
route.
In general, larger programs  have certain advantages, in that they can include both more
firms and a greater diversity of firms.  To insure value to participants and thus gain more
18  Mongolia is the only country that has used only voucher privatization to privatize medium and large
enterprises.  Every enterprise was sold for vouchers, first in a limited closed subscription to insiders and subsequently
to outsiders via the stock exchange (Korsun and Murrell,  1994).
21political support,  while at the same time divesting firms that might not attract cash offers,  it is
important to include some of the best firms in the program,  along with some of the more
marginal ones.  And perhaps more importantly, larger programs can achieve a greater degree
of privatization in a shorter period of time, given the relative slowness of other approaches.
2.  Decisions of Firms Whether and How to Participate
Another characteristic that varies among voucher privatization programs is the locus of
decisionmaking power regarding (1) whether and (2) in what form a particular firm will
participate.  As with the size of the program more generally, this locus evolves in large part
from the balance of political interests and powers in the particular country.  The government
of the former CSFR maintained full authority to choose which firms would participate in the
first wave of its voucher privatization, and the Czech government continued to apply this
principle in the second wave.  To what extent a particular firm would participate, i.e. the mix
in each individual case between voucher auctions and other forms of transfer (primarily sales
to strategic investors and restitution to former owners), was decided centrally,  but based on
bids submitted from competing bidders and prepared by them with little government
involvement.  Thus, the design process was decentralized in a competitive framework,  but the
final decision process was controlled at the top. This approach, attractive both economically
and practically, appears to have worked well in the politically centralized CSFR environment,
where strong inside stakeholders were absent.
Poland and Romania (in its 1991 program) both attempted to follow a more centralized
approach by giving the government broad powers to decide which firms would participate in
mass privatization and how they would participate.  While this was feasible in Romania,  given
the strong tradition of centralized power, it contradicted Poland's  diffuse power structure.
Indeed, managers and employees of Polish firms have maintained effective veto power over
the choice of privatization method.
223.  The Entry of Intermediaries
If ownership of enterprise shares were as widely disbursed as ownership of vouchers,
there would be little likelihood of effective corporate governance.  For this reason many mass
privatization programs have encouraged the creation of intermediary institutions to pool
ownership interests in particular enterprises.  How they have approached the creation of
intermediaries has differed, however.  The former CSFR allowed free entry of fully private
mutual funds, and over 420 funds participated in the first wave of privatization.  These funds
competed with each other to acquire vouchers from the public in exchange for fund shares.
The funds then invested the acquired vouchers in shares of firms being privatized at auctions.
One advantage of this approach was to reduce the state's direct control over the process,  i.e. to
"privatize"  the privatization process.
In contrast, the Romanian (1991) and Polish mass privatization plans called for the top-
down creation by the government of a certain pre-set number of investment intermediaries,
staffed by managers chosen by the supervisory boards appointed by the government.  The
shares of the intermediaries were then distributed to citizens, with no auctions taking place.
The hope behind this approach was that the intermediaries would actively restructure the firms
in their portfolios and then sell their interests, in the form of "strategic" interests to core
investors.  While the objective has merit,  the danger of such a top-down approach is that the
intermediaries may not be subject to direct market pressures and could end up essentially as
government-protected state holding companies.  In Romania, for example, the single state
ownership fund (SOF) was in 1991 allocated 70 percent of the shares of each commercial
company in the mass privatization program,  and was supposed to divest 10 percent of its
holdings per year.  Yet in four years it divested almost nothing, and the needed restructuring
of firms in its portfolios barely began. '9  Despite repeated statements that the program was on
the verge of being launched, the Polish "top-down" approach did not get off the ground until
1995 (after a delay of three years), in part because-unlike  in Romania-its  centralized design
was not in tune with the decentralized distribution of stakeholder power in the country.
'9  The private  ownership  funds  (POFs)  were far more  entrepreneurial  than  the state ownership  fund  (SOF).
However,  as the latter  owned  the majority  interests  in all participating  firms, the power  of the former  was severely
limited.
23Although the free entry and competition among funds in the Czech Republic is arguably
preferable to the bureaucratic approach of Romania or Poland, no approach has been without
problems.  It is proving to be extremely difficult in any transition setting to create truly private
funds with market-based incentives.  In particular, the perennial question of "who monitors the
monitors?"  looms over every experiment to date in mass privatization.  This is a difficult
enough challenge in advanced market economies.  It is even more problematic in transition
environments, where norms of disclosure and fiduciary responsibility are weak, and where
"watchdog"  institutions and oversight mechanisms are in their infancy.  Breaking the links
with the state, though perhaps desirable to stimulate entrepreneurship and risk-taking,  also
may mean weakening the capacity to monitor the monitors.
In the Czech Republic, as noted earlier,  the largest funds were founded by and are still
connected with the large Czech banks through asset management contracts.  These banks in
turn continue to be closely connected with the government, both through the sizable stake in
the banks owned by the National Property  Fund, and through the government's  regulatory
powers over the banks.  While some non-bank funds have quickly established their
independence and their potential (if not always actual) influence over managers, 20  the bank-
affiliated funds appear to be less independent and entrepreneurial.  (There may also be some
conflict of interest, to the extent banks lend to the same firms owned by funds they manage.)
On the other hand, it may be that these larger funds are more accountable and may thus be
more secure investments than the more entrepreneurial funds, which could perhaps have an
incentive to "loot"  an enterprise or take other actions at the expense of other shareholders.  To
the extent that several funds own shares in one firm, they have an incentive to monitor each
other, making it more difficult for any one fund to engage in such "looting" barring collusion
among the funds themselves. Although ownership limits arguably discourage active
governance by funds over firms, the need to have several significant owners for cross-
20  Although  Czech  investment  funds  routinely  gain representation  on boards  of enterprises  they own,
numerous  regulations  dampened  the incentives  of the investment  funds  to invest  heavily  in active  corporate
monitoring  and restructuring.  These include,  for example,  the 20 percent  limit  imposed  until  recently  on a fund's
ownership  of the shares  of any  particular  enterprise  and  the rigid fee structure  for fund managers  that  is not closely
linked  to the performance  of the portfolio. The pros and cons of these  and other  specific  regulations  are discussed  in
Coffee  (1996).
24monitoring purposes may be one argument in favor of limiting the percentage of shares that
can be owned by any one fund.
The Russian privatization program favored insiders (as noted above) but also allowed the
free entry of private investment funds.  Although some 600 funds were forned,  they were kept
much smaller than the Czech funds by the design of Russia's privatization program, and thus
they have far less power and influence.  In the Russian environment-with  no legal safeguards,
less macroeconomic discipline, and strong insider control over most privatized firns-the
goals of the funds are always clear.  Their small size leads may lead to complex coalitions
among them or between them and other actors in the economy.  Some funds appear to have
been established primarily for short-term voucher trading,  while others appear to be allied with
incumbent managers of individual firms, and still others appear primarily to seek subsidies
from government.  Only some appear interested in owning and improving the performance of
enterprises in the economy (Frydman et al, 1996).
In sum, intermediary institutions bring several advantages to voucher privatization
programs.  At a minimum they aggregate the power of individual vouchers and thereby
exercise some monitoring functions associated with ownership.  In addition to this minimum
function, allowing free entry of intermediaries and keeping them independent of state
ownership (either direct ownership or indirect ownership through other institutions such as
state-owned banks) helps both to "privatize"  the privatization process itself and to stimulate
competition in the market for corporate control.  Finally, some observers hope that the funds
will become the cornerstones (perhaps together with existing banks or even in place of them)
for the development of the financial infrastructure that is so essential for both capital allocation
and corporate  governance in market economies.  However, achieving these goals is not easy or
automatic.  The weakness of general oversight capabilities (whether laws,  institutions,
information, or norms of conduct) in all transition environments exacerbates the inherent
problem of "who monitors the monitors".  Careful attention must be given by transition
governments as to how they might regulate funds or, more feasibly, encourage cross-
monitoring among various funds or other owners to prevent self-dealing and encourage
responsible fiduciary behavior on the part of fund managers. The involvement of foreign
25financial experts as fund managers and advisors might help to strengthen norms of conduct
within funds and encourage cross-monitoring among them.  Interestingly, one potential
advantage of the "top down"  approach as designed in Poland is the ease of involving
foreigners in fund management.  Although foreigners may also become involved in a "free
entry"  system (and, indeed, in the CSFR case a foreign fund, Harvard Capital, was
instrumental in selling the program to the public and ended up to be one of the largest funds),
the involvement of foreigners is less of a policy lever at government's  command in such a
setting.
4.  Permitted Uses for Vouchers
Related closely to the size and role of intermediaries is the question of how citizens may
use their vouchers.  In the CSFR program, vouchers could be invested either in investment
funds or in firms themselves.  In the Romanian (1991) and Polish programs,  in contrast,
investing directly in firms was not an option.  (In the newer 1995 Romania program,  in
contrast,  investing in funds is not an option.)  In Estonia, citizens could use their vouchers to
acquire shares in firms (although relatively few shares were in the end offered for vouchers) or
to purchase land or the housing in which they live.
There seem to be no obvious costs, yet significant benefits, to allowing wide latitude to
investors.  Options create competition that can spur funds to greater effectiveness.
Furthermore,  options force citizens to become actively involved in voucher investment and
thus stimulate the development of investor interest and awareness.  In addition,  options allow
investors to tailor their choices to their own personal risk preferences.  While some people
have preferred direct investments, funds have proven to be more popular investment vehicles
than first expected.  For example, in the first "wave" of the CSFR program,  although original
expectations were that most vouchers would be invested directly in firms, 72 percent of
vouchers were ultimately invested in funds.
Furthermore,  citizens' choices need not be limited to investing their vouchers.  Trading
them is also a viable option, and permitting such trading may encourage the emergence of
strong, interested owners from the very diffuse initial distribution of vouchers.  If trading of
26vouchers is not permitted, imunediate rights to trade the shares acquired with vouchers is a
close substitute.  Most of the voucher schemes to date have given some latitude to citizens to
sell their interests, whether in the form of vouchers or of acquired shares.  Russia allowed
voucher trading from the beginning.  The former CSFR forbade secondary trading by citizens
in voucher points (although this was not strictly enforced) but encouraged trading in acquired
shares.  Such trading has developed rapidly through the Prague and over-the-counter  stock
exchanges and through off-exchange transactions.
A somewhat surprising development in the Czech Republic has been the concentrated
system of ownership and cross-ownership that has emerged from voucher privatization.  Over
420 funds participated in the first  "wave" of voucher privatization, (and 349 in the second
wave), and some 72 percent (64 percent in the second wave) of vouchers were entrusted to
those funds.  Yet, the largest 13 funds obtained 43 percent of all vouchers (41 percent  in the
second wave).  Not only is ownership of the economy concentrated in a few funds, but
individual funds often own shares of directly competing firms.  Furthermore,  as noted earlier,
the funds are themselves-together  with affiliated banks-locked  in an intricate web of cross
ownership (or sometimes self-ownership) as a result of the privatization of the banks
themselves through voucher privatization (Coffee, 1996). This web of cross-ownership not
only tends to insulate banks from competitive pressures, but it also perpetuates government's
influence over the Czech economy through its own 40 percent  (or greater) residual holdings
of shares in privatized banks.  The Czech voucher privatization appears to have led so far to a
rather tight concentration of ownership and economic power, dominated by the major banks,
the government,  and a few non-bank-affiliated private investment funds.
5.  The Organization of Auctions
Market-simulating voucher auctions are used to allocate enterprise shares in most
voucher schemes.  Only in the top-down allocation models of Poland and Romania are they
missing.  There are two fundamental ways to organize voucher auctions: simultaneously or
sequentially.  CSFR (in the first wave) and the Czech Republic (in the second wave) followed
a simultaneous approach, in which all voucher holders placed bids simultaneously for shares in
27all firms to be included in the auction.  The Bulgarian scheme proposed for 1996 follows a
similar approach.  Other countries (such as Georgia and Russia) have generally followed a
sequential approach, auctioning firms off one by one.  From an economic perspective the
Czech model is more efficient, because all options are known to all bidders at the time of the
auction, and the value (in terms of purchasing power) of a voucher does not vary over time as
in the sequential model. 2'  However, it is also more complex and costly and may be infeasible
in a larger country.
There are also two means to allocate shares within any particular auction.  One, chosen
in many countries because of its simplicity, is simply to divide shares on a pro-rata basis
among bidders based on the number of vouchers put forth.  The second, more complex
approach,  is to match bids against some independent measure of value and distribute  shares
only when bids and "offers" meet.  The Czech approach was a modified version of the latter
and used several rounds of bidding to equate demand and supply. Again, the result in the
Czech case was arguably fairer but perhaps only feasible because of the relatively small size of
the country, the relatively strong central control of the government, and the relatively
sophisticated level of understanding in both the government and the citizenry.  The Czech
approach was also facilitated by the country's  more stable macroeconomic situation, which
meant that inflation was moderate and thus valuations of firms more meaningful.
6.  Residual State Ownership or Control
Finally,  voucher privatization schemes vary in the degree of residual ownership
maintained by the state.  Romania, for example, privatized only a minority (30 percent) stake
in each enterprise  through its 1991 voucher scheme; indeed, some observers question whether
this was really privatization at all.  While privatizing majority stakes, the Czech Republic,
2  Because  the CSFR  model  used several  rounds  of auctions  to equate  supply  and demand,  as noted  below,
there was some  variation  in the purchasing  power  of vouchers  between  rounds. However,  the variation  was neither
as pronounced  nor spread  over as long  a period  as in some  other  countries. In Russia,  which  held open voucher
auctions  after closed-subscription  auctions  had been  held inside  firms, the market  price of vouchers  rose and fell
consistently  and extensively  over two  years. Investors  tried to weigh  the number  of outstanding  vouchers  against  the
value  of firms yet to be offered  for auction  (whose  very identity  was constantly  changing),  and to incorporate  into  that
their perceptions  regarding  the political  sustainability  of the process.
28Poland,  and Russia all left significant minority stakes in the hands of government property
funds, with a view to using these stakes later to attract "strategic investors" (or otherwise
influence events).  The Polish government also has the initial power to appoint the managers
and supervisory boards of the funds.
If the state is to maintain a stake in firms post-privatization, the stake should be small
22 and temporary,  and the state should maintain a relatively passive stance in governance.
Extensive residual state ownership and/or control can lead to conflicts of interest that diminish
if not nullify the hoped-for positive effects of voucher privatization, particularly  if remaining
ownership interests are widely dispersed and therefore passive (Pistor and Turkewitz, 1996).
III.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reviewed the goals of privatization and has attempted to evaluate the
various methods used in different transition settings to achieve them.  The task is not merely
one of changing ownership per se, but also involves a fundamental reorientation and/or
creation of legal norms and supporting institutions to enable these new owners to exercise full
ownership rights and corporate  governance responsibilities.  Experiments in privatization
abound,  from extensive efforts at sales to strategic owners (as in Hungary and Estonia) to
programs based primarily on insider buyouts (as in Russia and Slovenia) to innovative mass
privatization programs  involving the creation of large and powerful new financial
intermediaries (as in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland).  These efforts are often
complemented by extensive programs of restitution to pre-socialist owners and/or by smaller
programs of bank-led debt-equity conversion or public offering of shares on newly-emerging
stock markets. Each of these approaches has inherent advantages and risks, and in essence
"the jury  is still out" as to which will prove best in the longer run.  At present, however,  if
the objective is to sever the links between the state and the enterprise and school the
population in market basics, the weight of initial evidence appears to point in favor of
22  This does not mean  that governments  should ignore  governance  altogether. At a minimum,  they should
continue  to monitor  in order to prevent fraud and asset-stripping.
29significant reliance on voucher privatization, particularly given the difficulty most countries
face in finding willing cash investors.  Among voucher privatization programs certain design
characteristics appear to simulate beneficial competition and a market for corporate control:
*  free entry of financial intermediaries,
*  freedom of investor choice (whether in firms or in intermediaries) and immediate free
tradability of shares (and perhaps even vouchers),
*  as few insider preferences as feasible (given the distribution of preexisting political power
among stakeholders), and
*  little if any residual state ownership, but early and strong attention to the critical
government tasks of:
*  developing legal norms of fiduciary responsibility,  legal remedies to enforce them,
and "watchdog"  institutions to implement them,
*  encouraging ownership patterns that promote both competition among firms and
corporate governance both of firms and of intermediaries (perhaps, for example, by
preserving some degree of ownership for "strategic  investors,"  by limiting individual
funds'  stakes to encourage cross-monitoring among funds, or by imposing strict
antimonopoly regulations), and
*  encouraging the development of stock markets to promote the further evolution of
ownership.
This is to a significant extent-though  not entirely-the  Czech model of privatization.  In
particular,  the Czech case differs along the fourth criterion noted above.  Not only have
disclosure and oversight capacities over funds (and to some extent firms) been weak, but the
concentration  of ownership and control over much of the economy -- primarily in the hands of
a few funds and large banks, and to a significant extent the government through these other
two, and through its own significant residual holdings -- is cause for concern.
A final lesson from experience is that formal programs of enterprise privatization are
only part of the picture-and  often only a small part, although they have received most of the
attention. A process of asset  "recombination" of property is occurring, often behind the
scenes, throughout the transition world, whether a "recombination"  from state to private firms
30(Stark,  1996) or from some private firms to others (generally from private firms that are more
widely-held, either directly or indirectly through funds, to more closely-held ones).  Extensive
privatization is thus in fact occurring even in countries where formal privatization has been
slow (such as the Ukraine or Bulgaria), and extensive "recombination"  may be likely even in
countries where it has been fast.  In the Czech Republic, for example, not only will the
ownership both of enterprise shares by funds and of fund shares by individuals change through
formal and informal trading, but the ownership of enterprise assets may themselves shift to
some extent as owners (particularly certain funds) or managers sell or spin off assets into new
companies.  In Russia, this shifting of assets to new, more closely-held firms may be quite
widespread, as managers with small minority ownership stakes in newly-privatized firms
attempt to gain greater control over assets.  As one Hungarian observer noted, this is the
period of "primitive capital accumulation"  in the post-socialist world.  Although formal
programs may lay important groundrules, the tremendous economic, legal, political, and even
moral uncertainty profoundly affect-and  may even overwhelm-most  formal efforts at
privatization.  It is beyond our ability or insight to know what the final outcome will be.  Both
the economic outcomes of these various paths and our efforts to assess them are just beginning
to yield insights, and it will be years-if  not generations-before  a definitive story can be told.
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